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Abstract
We present PIRASA: an agent-based simulation environment for studying how autonomous agents can best interact with each
other to exchange goods in e-commerce marketplaces. A marketplace in PIRASA enables agents to enact buyer or seller roles
and select from sales, auction, and negotiation protocols to achieve the individual goals of their users. An agent’s strategy
to maximize its utility in the marketplace is guided by its user’s preferences and constraints such as ‘maximum price’ and
‘deadline’, as well as an agent’s personality attributes, e.g., how ‘eager’ or ‘late’ the agent can be for exchanging goods and
whether the agent is a ‘spender’ or ‘saver’ in an exchange. To guide the agent’s actions selected by a strategy, we use the
notion of electronic contracts formulated as regulatory norms. In this context, we present how PIRASA is organized with
regards to seller processes for goods submission, the inclusion of buyer preferences, and the management of transactions
through specialized broker agents. Using randomized simulations, we demonstrate how a buyer agent can strategically select
the most suitable protocol to satisfy its user’s preferences, goals and constraints in dynamically changing market settings.
The generated simulation data can be leveraged by researchers to analyze agent behaviors, and develop additional strategies.
Keywords Agent-based e-commerce · Protocol selection · Electronic contracts · Simulation
JEL Classification C63 · D44 · K12 · L86
Introduction
The evolution of the Internet has brought about new
standard procedures for purchasing goods online using Web
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browsers or mobile applications (Alt and Zimmermann
2016; Spiekermann et al. 2015). Using these procedures,
referred to commonly as protocols, users can bid on items
they would like to buy in auctions, they can negotiate with
the sellers directly to get the best possible price, and they
can order at a fixed price to get the item quickly. Since there
are many alternative forms of such protocols to choose from,
it is important that users can strategically select the best one
for their needs.
Consider the following scenario. Bob wants to buy a
present for his father as father’s day is approaching. He has
a watch in mind that he thinks his father would like. He
goes online, searches for potential sellers and finds two: One
has the watch in stock and provides a direct sales protocol
for purchasing the watch at the standard price for next-day
delivery, whereas the other provides an auction protocol
which allows for buying the watch at a much lower price
but it could potentially take much longer time to complete.
Given the time constraint Bob has due to father’s day, he
decides to purchase the watch from the first seller, using the
direct sales protocol.
It is becoming increasingly common for virtual assistant
systems such as ‘Amazon Echo’ and ‘Google Home’ to
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contain basic integration into e-commerce platforms in
addition to their information retrieval capabilities. Although
these systems have the capability to purchase items for
a fixed price, they are unable to enact strategies for the
acquisition of goods in e-commerce markets with varying
protocols (e.g., Auctions). With recent advances in agent
technology and machine learning, such personal agents
should be able to make decisions on behalf of their users’
goals, preferences and constraints. An agent should be able
to search through available marketplaces for potential
sellers, and determine which protocol would result in a pur-
chase that meets the user’s needs, possibly based on further
interactions with other agents, whether human or artificial.
The issue then becomes, if we had to build such an agent,
how to determine in an electronic market which protocol is
most suitable to best satisfy the specific user’s needs.
We present PIRASA: An agent-based simulation frame-
work that is designed to test different strategies in dynamic
electronic marketplaces, and evaluate which protocol is the
most preferable given the user’s goals, preferences, and con-
straints. For example, an agent can be designed to help
Bob choose the best protocol for purchasing a watch for
his father. Such an agent should understand that Bob’s time
constraint is more important (since father’s day is approach-
ing) than the price of the watch. Therefore, the agent should
decide to purchase the watch from the seller offering a direct
sales protocol. However, if the watch offered by the direct
sales protocol is significantly more expensive than purchas-
ing the watch through an auction, then Bob’s agent might
reconsider its decision. Agents in PIRASA additionally have
personality traits. For example, some buyers are eager to
buy an item, whereas others prefer to save money when
purchasing items online. Similarly, some sellers offer fast
delivery times, whereas others offer good deals via flexible
pricing options. Each seller also has a preferred sales type
chosen among three general purchase protocols: direct sales,
negotiation, and auction. PIRASA supports endless protocol
configurations based on the protocol attributes, e.g. duration
which determines the amount of time before the protocol
terminates.
We use the notion of electronic contracts to regulate the
interactions between the agents in a protocol, which are
formalized via social norms represented as commitments,
authorizations, and prohibitions (Singh 2013). Agent
reasoning about norms is provided via the Event Calculus
(Chesani et al. 2013; Kafalı and Yolum 2016). In our
scenario above, Bob can check the delivery status of the
watch via his contract with the seller. If something goes
wrong and delivery is missed for father’s day, the seller
should commit to issuing a refund for Bob. A normative
approach provides a high level of organizational flexibility,
where the involved parties can create or cancel a norm,
release it, or delegate it to others.
We propose to perform strategic protocol selection
via simulations. Once presented with a set of alternative
purchase protocols and market options, the buyer agent
simulates its potential interactions in each available protocol
and records its utility, which results in a ranking of
the protocols. The multiagent simulation infrastructure
of our framework relies upon the JADE agent platform
(Bellifemine et al. 2000), on top of which we have provided
a user interface to configure various properties of the
simulation. PIRASA incorporates dynamic market elements
and agent autonomy into the simulation environment.
Design-time solutions such as model checking (Bataineh
et al. 2017; Montali et al. 2014) fail to incorporate such
autonomy, and can only verify whether an agent’s goals
comply with the protocol specification. To the best of our
knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to tackle this
problem from a run-time perspective.
Our contributions are as follows:
• We provide a simulation framework for agent-based
electronic commerce, where buyer agents interact with
seller agents through broker agents. The broker agents
regulate the interactions between the agents (formalized
via regulatory norms) in the market.
• We generate multiple seller behaviors using the
available agent traits in the framework for three protocol
types; direct sales, negotiation and auction.
• We create multiple market settings, which reflect
different levels of competitiveness and purchase options
for the buyers, and simulate the buyer agents’ strategies
in those settings. We propose hypotheses on how buyer
agents should behave in the presence of other buyers,
and verify the hypotheses using buyer utilities gathered
from the simulation data.
• Other researchers can benefit from the generated
simulation data to analyze buyer and seller behaviors,
and develop additional strategies.
PIRASA structure and overview
Parallel to the growing of electronic markets, practical e-
commerce systems need to adapt to end users’ preferences.
To facilitate their construction, it is first necessary
to develop a framework for the automated simulation,
evaluation and comparison of strategies for the purchase of
goods in markets with varying protocols.
The problem domain discussed in this work is e-
commerce agent-based market simulation, whose solutions
are instances of practice-inspired research (Sein et al.
2011). The practice that motivates our work is online
shopping. In current state of the art, human users visit
a number of websites to choose the best buying option
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based on their needs. For example, if a user wants to
buy a watch, that user can order it from “Amazon Prime”
with “Next Day Delivery” option, or buy the same watch
from an “eBay” auction for a lower price but with longer
order processing time (e.g. wait for the auction to finish).
Reasoning about the tradeoffs among such choices results
in a loss of time for the user. Our proposal acts as a
recommender system for automating this tedious process by
using intelligent agents that know the preferences of their
users. Specifically, we propose a framework, PIRASA, to
support negotiation, auction, and purchasing protocols, and
the capacity of agents to conduct strategies for optimising
their users’ market utilities.
To determine the necessary attributes of a system to
solve this problem, we aimed to develop a system that
could simulate the common protocols found in modern
e-commerce markets with sufficient agents to simulate
protocols in even the most crowded of markets (Akula and
Menasce´ 2004). In order to motivate the agent’s strategy, it
is also necessary to imbue the agent with two key constraints
that humans experience in traditional markets, i.e. time and
cost.
“Technical background” reviews the technical back-
ground for PIRASA, and “PIRASA framework” describes the
various components of its implementation. “Experiments”
demonstrates our practical findings through simulation
experiments, and discusses the potential integration of real-
world e-commerce datasets to infer simulation parameters.
Table 1 summarises the application stages of our use case,
inspired by Action Design Research (ADR) methodology
(Sein et al. 2011). We describe in detail the prototype imple-
mentation and evaluation stages of PIRASA in “PIRASA
framework” and “Experiments”; respectively.
When comparing with existing work, a number of
different criteria can be used, namely: (i) The capacity of
the system to operate with large numbers of agents; (ii) the
number of e-commerce protocols that can be simulated; (iii)
the flexibility of agents to mirror the myriad constraints and
preferences that influence human behaviour when operating
in a market; and (iv) the ease with which new agent
strategies can be constructed. PIRASA is designed with
these criteria in mind, and is compared in “Related work”
with the relevant literature on simulation environments and
e-commerce platforms.
Technical background
In this section, we review the technical background that
our simulation framework is built upon; electronic contracts
and their formalization as regulatory norms, agent reasoning
based in the Event Calculus, and the agent development
platform JADE.
Electronic contracts and norms
A contract describes how the involved parties should act
in a business dealing. We adopt social norms (Singh
2013) to formally represent electronic contracts. Norms
(commitments, authorizations, and prohibitions) take their
basis from deontic logic concepts (Von Wright 1999),
and have been widely used in fields of artificial intelli-
gence that deal with legal concepts (Boella and van der
Torre 2008; Dechesne et al. 2013), compliance check-
ing (Governatori 2013), and requirements engineering
(Kafalı et al. 2016a).
Table 1 ADR methodology for online shopping use case
Stage Description Artifact
Stage 1: Problem Formulation
Practice-Inspired Research Driven by the need for automation in online Shortcomings for automation and
shopping decision-making process. tool support for human users.
Theory-Ingrained Artifact Artificial intelligence and agent-based models. Agent development frameworks.
Stage 2: Prototype Development
Market design Literature survey (Alrayes et al. 2017) to gather Conceptual design of the online
parameters for realistic electronic markets. shopping market.
Evaluation Agent-based simulation environment to Alpha Version: Prototype
evaluate the accuracy of protocol choices. implementation in JADE.
Stage 3: Reflection and Learning
Analysis of Results Recognition of limitations regarding the Beta Version: Improve
current prototype. Involve human users in prototype to include
the next phase. Interview online shoppers user-friendly interface
to better understand needs. and human-controlled agents.
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Fig. 1 Lifecycle of norms. Dark rectangles represent terminal states, i.e., the norm’s lifecycle ends in those states
Formally, a norm n(X, Y, antecedent, consequent)
represents a social relationship between its subject (X) and
object (Y) regarding its consequent when its antecedent
holds. Here, n is the norm type (c for commitment, a for
authorization, or p for prohibition), X and Y are agents,
and the antecedent and the consequent are first-order logic
predicates (either atomic propositions, or conjunctions or
disjunctions of them). We model conditional, detached,
satisfied, and violated norm states. Figure 1 describes the
lifecycle of norms (Kafalı et al. 2016b). A conditional norm
is detached when its antecedent holds. Satisfaction and
violation conditions are described according to the norm
type.
In this paper, we mainly adopt the commitment
norm as the basis for representing electronic contracts.
Commitments have previously been used in e-commerce
(Kafalı and Torroni 2012; Kafalı and Yolum 2016).
Consider the following commitment:
c(store, customer, payment, delivery) (1)
The above commitment is a conditional commitment;
if the antecedent (payment) is satisfied, then the subject
(store) becomes committed to the object (customer) for
satisfying the consequent (delivery), and the commitment
becomes detached. A base-level commitment is simply a
commitment with its antecedent condition being true. If
the consequent is satisfied, the commitment is satisfied.
After the commitment is detached, if the consequent is not
satisfied, the commitment is violated.
Event calculus
Event Calculus (EC) (Kowalski and Sergot 1986) is an
extension of first-order logic to interpret and reason about
events in time. Table 2 summarizes the domain-independent
axioms of EC. Predicate happens records events with the
time points of their occurrence. Predicate initially specifies
fluents that hold initially. Predicate holds at queries the
happened events to check whether a fluent holds at a
specified time point. Predicate initiates marks that an event
initiates a fluent at a specified time point. Predicate broken
checks whether a fluent is terminated during a time period.
Predicate terminates marks that an event terminates a fluent
at a specified time point.
We adopt the Reactive Event Calculus (REC) (Chesani
et al. 2013) as a logic programming tool that extends EC for
run-time monitoring. The REC engine takes as input (i) a
normative theory shared amongst all agents that describes
how norms change state; (ii) a protocol description specific
to each individual agent that describes the domain, e.g.,
consequences of the agents’ actions as well as any known
facts; and (iii) a narrative specific to each individual agent
that contains the events performed through the evolution of
time.
Listing 1 demonstrates a sample narrative in EC.
According to the recorded events, the customer has paid for
the item at time 4, the store has processed the order at time
5, and the courier has delivered the item at time 7. Like
protocol descriptions, event traces are agent-dependent.
That is, each agent is aware of only the events that are
relevant, but does not see the events that might have
happened for other agents.
Once the REC engine is run with the above input, it
produces an outcome that demonstrates the fluents the agent
is aware of through time (e.g., states of commitments).
REC can be extended with additional functionality besides
commitment tracking such as exception handling behavior
(Kafalı and Torroni 2012; Kafalı 2012).
JADE platform
Agent-Based simulation is a widely adopted technique in
distributed artificial intelligence to analyze agent behaviors
Table 2 Domain-independent axioms of the Event Calculus
Predicate Description
happens(E, T) Event E happens at Time T
initially(F) Fluent F is true at Time 0
holds at(F, T) Fluent F is true at Time T
initiates at(E, F, T) Event E initiates fluent F at Time T
broken(F, Ts, Te) Fluent F is made false between times Ts and Te
terminates at(E, F, T) Event E terminates fluent F at Time T
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Listing 1 Sample narrative in
EC
and strategies. Amongst many agent development and
simulation environments, we adopt JADE (Bellifemine et al.
2000) to develop our agents as it provides reliable agent
communication and documentation support. Moreover,
despite the existence of a number of other Java agent
development platforms (Luke et al. 2004; Baumer et al.
1999; Xu and Shatz 2003), JADE is actively maintained
and compliant to the FIPA1 agent standard. JADE provides
a library of Java classes to develop agent strategies
as well as graphical interfaces to configure and run
simulations. JADE supports asynchronous messaging for
agent communication, and provides yellow pages for
publish & subscribe type services to simulate electronic
markets.
PIRASA framework
E-commerce transactions in the real world such as listing and
purchasing of items are simplified for buyers and sellers on sites
such as Amazon and eBay by acting as a hub between the
agents. We propose to mimic such transactions on the web
by adding “broker” agents in addition to the sheer number
of potential buyers and sellers. The inclusion of brokers
simplifies the process of a potential buyer finding a seller,
and therefore both increases the throughput of the system,
while minimizing the amount of time an agent is actively
looking for a new transaction. We adopt the electronic con-
tract framework proposed by Wood et al. (2013) and extend
it to reflect the architecture shown in Fig. 2.
Agents and transactions
PIRASA supports three types of agents: sellers, buyers, and
brokers.
(i) Sellers and product submission: At the beginning
of a simulation, broker agents solicit the seller agents
to publish all items they want to sell through the
broker in the form of services. In order for a seller
to submit their item for sale to a broker, the seller
first locates all brokers and then sends each one a
message asking them to host the item. This seller
protocol is shown in Fig. 3. Each broker replies
either rejecting the proposal, or returning a potential
protocol with which to host the item. The seller
can then select the protocol which best suits its
1http://www.fipa.org/
goal, e.g., whether they want to maximize profit or
prefer a quick transaction. At this point, a message
of confirmation containing details about the item is
sent to the preferred broker. The broker then replies
with a confirmation of receipt, and instantiates an
unactivated service. Potential buyers can now attempt
to obtain the item, which triggers the activation of the
service, starting the count down to its termination.
(ii) Buyers and user preferences: The formulation of
buyer agents’ goals enables constraints to be placed
on how a buyer goes about obtaining items. A goal
can currently be constrained by a time limit, a price
limit, or both. For example, if an agent has a time
constraint (i.e., deadline) for an item and there is an
auction which will only end after the time constraint
has been violated, then the buyer will ignore it.
However, a buyer will not make any assumptions with
regards to the total duration of a negotiation, as it is
possible at any point for the seller to accept an offer,
and end the negotiation. PIRASA currently supports
the following four attributes for buyers:
• Eagerness: The propensity of an agent to place a
high urgency on a transaction. A high eagerness
modifier results in agents aiming for the quickest
transactions possible.
• Lateness: The propensity of an agent to place a
low urgency on a transaction.
• Spending: The propensity for an agent to
enter into monetarily unfavorable transactions in
exchange for eagerness.
• Saving: The propensity for an agent to enter only
into highly favorable transactions.
(iii) Brokers and market transactions: Buyers initiate
market interactions by requesting all broker agents for
services which match their goals (see Fig. 2). Upon
perceiving the services available, a buyer strategically
determines the best service to subscribe to, in
accordance with its personality traits. Depending on
the nature of the service, upon the receipt of a new
offer from a buyer, the broker enforces the rules of the
protocol in terms of a set of norms. If accepted, the
buyer engages in a contract with the seller to receive
the item in the allotted time. Buyer agents are affected
by two factors when reasoning on a service. Their
personality traits either increase or decrease their
tolerance of higher prices or service durations. Their
goals enforce constraints over the cost and duration of
possible services.
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Fig. 2 A service oriented
architecture showing the buyer
engaging with sellers to find a
service
Predefined protocols
A protocol in PIRASA is defined as a seven-tuple containing
two integers and five boolean variables (described in
detail in “Custom protocols”), which represent fundamental
parameters of real world transaction protocols. The protocol
description acts as a blueprint for the creation of a service,
which in turn is the construct that actually handles offers
from the buyer agents, and establishes norms among the
buyer and seller agents. PIRASA supports three predefined
protocols.
(i) Direct sales: A direct sales protocol is the simplest
common method of transaction. A buyer offers the
broker the asking price for the item and the protocol
completes immediately. The protocol results in an
item being sold for the market price with little time
spent (not taking into account delivery times). Direct
sales is favored by agents that have personalities
with a high “eagerness” value. The below conditional
commitment is created between the buyer and seller.
c(seller, buyer, payment, delivery) (2)
Fig. 3 Negotiation protocol:
Seller agent handling offers
placed by buyer agents
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When the seller is notified of payment, it is
committed to ensuring the delivery of the item.
The progression of commitment states is handled by
each agent’s REC engine. Note that the commitment
theory is not the focus of this paper. However, we
still record the number of commitment violations per
agent as part of our simulation data.
(ii) Auction: An auction is defined as an interaction
between any number of buyers and a single seller that
lasts for a predetermined time, mediated by a broker.
Technically, the auction is regarded as a single-item,
first-price, open-cry, ascending auction (Parsons et al.
2011; Harris and Raviv 1981). An auction is started as
soon as the seller accepts the proposal from the broker
to host it, and during its lifecycle the broker receives
bids from any buyer agent. The broker does not
interact with the seller during this time, and therefore
can accept or reject an offer based on whether or
not the offering agent has violated any norms. Once
a buyer has its offer accepted by the broker, the
following norms are created amongst the buyer, seller,
and broker.
a(buyer, broker, true, bid) (3)
c(buyer, seller, highest bid, payment) (4)
c(seller, buyer, payment, delivery) (5)
Norm 3 states that all buyers are authorized to
make bids on the auctioned item. Norm 4 states
that the buyer with the highest bid is committed to
sending the payment to the seller. This commitment
ensures that there is no way for a buyer to
retract a bid (that has not been outbid) without
violating their commitment. Norm 5 is the same
commitment from the direct sales protocol (Norm
2) that handles delivery of the item once it is paid
for.
(iii) Negotiation: A negotiation protocol is somewhat
similar to the auction protocol outlined above, in that
it is better for the buyer when it is not competing with
others for an item, otherwise it is advantageous for the
seller. The negotiation architecture is demonstrated
in Fig. 3. Since the seller has control over whether
or not it will accept an offer, it can make counter-
offers to buyers which will result in the item being
sold below its market value, or alternatively the seller
can wait for a long time to receive a higher offer
by rejecting all lower offers. Certainly, this is a
riskier strategy, because if a seller overvalues their
item, it could result in no sale being made at all.
In PIRASA, the propensity for sellers to adopt such
strategies is based on their personalities, which are
determined by attributes such as greed and eagerness.
The following norms are relevant for the negotiation
protocol.
a(buyer, seller, reject off er, off er) (6)
c(buyer, seller, accept off er, payment) (7)
c(seller, buyer, payment, delivery) (8)
Norm 6 states that the buyer is authorized to make an
offer if its previous offer is rejected by the seller. Norm 7
states that the buyer is committed to sending the payment
to the seller if the offer is accepted. Norm 8 is the same
commitment from the direct sales protocol (Norm 2) that
handles delivery of the item once it is paid for.
Custom protocols
It is crucial for market designers to customize the protocols
available in their market place to attract a variety of buyers
and sellers. In addition to the predefined protocols, PIRASA
supports the creation of new protocols via customization of
protocol attributes. The attributes of a service encapsulating
a protocol are the following:
• Max clients: The maximum number of buyers which
can subscribe to the service. In the case of an an auction,
for example, there would be no limit, but for a sale, the
maximum number would be one.
• Max length: The maximum number of time steps that
the service lasts. In the case of an auction, it would be
a finite number, whereas for a negotiation it would be
infinite, as a negotiation lasts as long as the two parties
want it to before the transaction is finalized.
• Seller involvement: Whether the broker is authorized
to make decisions on the seller’s behalf. For example,
if during a negotiation the broker can accept an offer
made by the buyer, or whether they have to forward the
message to the seller for approval.
• Alternating offers: Whether the seller is authorized to
make counter offers to the buyer. Used exclusively with
seller involvement.
• Buyer informed: Whether the broker informs buyers
when they are outbid.
• Activate immediately: Whether a service is activated
immediately, or whether it is activated when a bid has
first been placed on it.
• One offer per buyer: Whether a buyer is authorized to
have more that one outstanding offer on a service.
These attributes enable a variety of protocols to be for-
mulated, including direct sales, auctions, and negotiations.
When looking for a particular item, buyers look for a proto-
col for that specific item. They can either activate a dormant
service, or join a running one (assuming that the max-
clients variable is greater than than the number of agents the
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have already placed offers). A protocol is initially created
dormant, with no buyers subscribed to it. As soon as the first
buyer subscribes, the protocol is activated and it exists only
for as long as its max length is not surpassed. A protocol can




To highlight the use of PIRASA, we construct a set of
experiments to test the individual utility of several buyer
agents. Each experiment is repeated 100 times with the
average utility being measured and compared amongst
buyers. The utility metric identifies the effectiveness of
buyer agents, which corresponds to the goal completion
rate of buyers. Naturally, this metric is most useful for
simulations in which there are fewer number of sellers.
Buyers: We describe three buyer personalities with the
following parameters:
• EagerSaver: agents have eager and saver traits of 0.7.
• EagerSpender: agents have eager and spend traits of
0.9 and 0.7, respectively.
• Saver: agents have eager and saver traits of 0.4 and
0.9, respectively.
Sellers & Protocols: In our experiments sellers are
described by the protocols that they support in order to
sell their goods.
• Sales—allows sellers to sell goods at a fixed price;
• Auction—lets the market of buyers determine the
price of goods; and
• Negotiation—supports sellers to negotiate with
buyers the price of goods.
In Table 3 we show how the protocols compare with one
another.
Table 3 Comparison of the Seller protocols we consider
In addition to the creation of the above scenarios,
we capture data from human users in historical Ebay
auctions (Jank and Shmueli 2010, 2017), specifically the
auctions of Cartier watches that lasted 7 days. We transform
this data to agent traits and constraints, enabling the
simulation and permutation of historical auctions, for the
purpose of evaluating whether historical outcomes could
be improved. From historical bids, we normalise the bid
price and bid time, deriving the proportion of an auction
that has elapsed, and the proportion of the end price
that has been achieved at every bid. We then regress bid
time against bid price for each bidder, and capture the
resultant parameters as ‘Eager’ and ‘Spender/Saver’ traits
for each participant in the auction, applying ‘Max Price’
constraints derived from the maximum bid that each user
made. The above development is reflected in the following
subsections, where we describe our simulations and
results.
We applied simulated annealing to derive the
agent attributes, implemented using the Opt4j library
(Lukasiewycz et al. 2011). Our goal is to determine the
optimal parameters for each agent in a PIRASA simulation,
such that the output bid ordering is the same as an equiva-
lent historical auction - thus demonstrating that PIRASA is
able to simulate the dynamics of historical auctions, with
few parameters. Formally, given a simulation with n agents
(n ≥ 2), our aim is to minimise f ′(o, h), the mean-square
of the differences of indices of each element between o and
h, where o is the output of a PIRASA run; a sequence of bids
o = {o1, o2, ..., on}, and h is the sequences of bids from a
historical auction or negotiation h = {h1, h2, ..., hn}. We
randomly initialise a set of parameter vectors, representing
Eagerness (e), Lateness (l), Spender (sp) and Saver (sa).
We sample the output from a PIRASA run, determined
by these parameters, and generate a fitness value from
the mean-square differences, with which we can continue
annealing.
For each of the three experiments, we reran the annealing
to estimate the optimal parameters for that scenario. As
we are not attempting to learn a generalisable function of
PIRASA, but rather learn the best parameters for a given
auction, over-fitting did not present an issue.
Simulations
For all experiments, we simulate the selected buyers in all
three protocols and report the average utilities. Moreover,
we state our hypotheses informally, and investigate whether
they hold.
Simulation 1: We examine a buyer agent with an
“EagerSaver” personality. There are no other buyer
agents (as competitors) in this setting.
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Hypothesis 1: We expect the agent to prefer faster (due
to eager) and cheaper (due to saver) services. Therefore,
we anticipate that the agent would gain higher utility in
either direct sales or negotiation protocols. Since there is
no competition from other buyers, the simulations should
result in a low mean spend for the agent.
Simulation 2: We examine two buyer agents with
“EagerSaver” and “EagerSpender” personalities.
Hypothesis 2: Since the EagerSpender agent has a
higher propensity to spend, and is more eager than the
EagerSaver agent, we expect the EagerSpender agent to
out-compete the EagerSaver agent in instances where
both agents attempt to bid in the same service. Moreover,
since the EagerSpender agent does not care about the
price of an item, we anticipate that it would gain higher
utility in direct sales protocols.
Simulation 3: We examine three buyer agents with
all three personalities; “EagerSaver”, “EagerSpender”,
“Saver”.
Hypothesis 3: We expect the Saver agent to only bid
when the service price is low and therefore to remain
dormant unless a service exists in the market with an
item price low enough to entice the agent. We anticipate
that the Saver agent would be out-competed in cases
where it shares a protocol with other buyer agents
(as competitors), and therefore have the lowest utility
amongst other buyers.
Simulations 4–7: We extract traits from four historical
Ebay auctions whose dynamics are illustrated in Fig. 7.
We use these traits to construct four auction-only settings
composed of three to five buyer agents.
Hypotheses 4–7: We expect the bidding dynamics of the
simulated agents to closely correspond to the dynamics of
human bidders in the historical auctions, where the bids
being placed reflect the historical trend.
Results
Below, we summarize our main observations about the
first three simulations, and compare them with our initial
hypotheses.
Fig. 4 The stacked mean utility for EagerSaver in Simulation 1
No competition: In Simulation 1, where there are no
competing buyers, we observe via Fig. 4 that the
EagerSaver agent maintains a mean utility of one, as in
each run it has three possible services to choose from
with no competition. As compatible with our hypothesis,
it chooses direct sales and negotiation protocols more
often than auctions.
Spend vs save: In Simulation 2, we have two competing
buyers (EagerSaver and EagerSpender), which are both
more likely to choose direct sales and negotiation
protocols than Auctions. However, since EagerSpender
can spend more and is highly eager in nature, we
observe via Fig. 5 that it out-competes EagerSaver in
almost all direct sale protocols, forcing the EagerSaver
agent to fulfill its goal mainly through negotiation and
auction protocols (compatible with our hypothesis). This
competition results in both agents ending the simulation
with high, albeit suboptimal utility.
Effect of competition: In Simulation 3, we have all three
buyer personalities in the same environment. The Saver
agent is far less likely to spend money in pursuit of its
goals, and is therefore more timorous than the other two
agents. We observe via Fig. 6 that there is significant
competition between the agents, driving down the overall
utilities of all agents. Surprisingly and in contrary to
our initial hypothesis, the Saver agent maintains a higher
mean utility than the EagerSaver agent. This is possibly
due to the agent being less likely to compete in direct
sales protocols against the EagerSpender agent, and
instead going for negotiation protocols. This is a different
strategy than what the EagerSaver agent adopts. The
EagerSaver agent (unsuccessfully) attempts to compete
with EagerSpender on direct sale protocols.
Fig. 5 The stacked mean utilities for EagerSaver and EagerSpender in
Simulation 2
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Fig. 6 The stacked mean utilities for EagerSaver, EagerSpender and
Saver in Simulation 3
The above results support our hypotheses that the
agents with high “Spend” and “Eager” modifiers have
the highest utility, and generally out-compete agents
with “Save” modifiers in markets with a fixed number
of protocols and agents. Moreover, we observe that
competition (the inclusion of other buyers in the
market) impacts the utility of buyers in closed market
environments, resulting in a change of utility from 1.0 to
0.76 from Simulation 1 to Simulation 3.
Historical data: In Simulations 4–7, we find that
capturing the ‘Eagerness’, ‘Spending’, and ‘Saving’
attributes of agents and using the ‘Max Cost’ constraints
from bid history are sufficient to replicate the dynamics
of four historical Ebay auctions (Jank and Shmueli
2017). A comparison of Figs. 7 (real auction data) and
8 (agent-based simulations) shows that our simulated
buyer agents make bids that closely mimic those placed
by their human counterparts. Moreover, due to the
autonomy associated with agent behaviours, some agent
bids show deviations from mined data, which would
enable e-commerce researchers to simulate settings with
varying market dynamics. Further experimentation in
this direction would improve the prediction of bidding
behavior in online auctions using human-based historical
data, and enable the development of more sophisticated
agents.
Performance evaluation
We evaluate the performance of PIRASA through a series
of experiments with numbers of agents ranging from 50 to
500, incrementing by 50. We run these experiments on an
i7 4770k computer with 16gb of memory running Windows
7 64-bit OS. For each experiment we run 3 sets of 10
simulation runs with an equal number of buyers and sellers,
finding the average time taken for 10 runs to elapse. We
then derive from this the average length of a single run.
One can see from Fig. 9a that there is a linear increase in
the simulation time, up until 350 agents. This number of
agents is quite significant compared to other e-commerce
Fig. 7 Four historical Ebay Auctions (with auction IDs), each lasting seven days, with normalised bids
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Fig. 8 Four simulated Ebay Auctions, using agent traits mined from an analysis of each historical auction
platforms with considerable computational requirements for
the running agents.
We run a similar performance evaluation for
RECON (Alrayes et al. 2016). Figure 9b shows that the
average cycle time for buyer agents in RECON grow lin-
early over 100 runs with increasing numbers of agents.
Although the simulation settings in PIRASA and RECON
vary, we can see by comparison of two plots that PIRASA
can support a fairly large number of concurrent agents
to simulate e-commerce protocols. Moreover, note that
PIRASA can support multiple protocols whereas RECON is
specifically built for negotiation protocols.
Related work
In this section, we review relevant literature on agent-based
simulation environments and e-commerce platforms, and
compare their contributions to PIRASA.
There has been extensive research in recent years into
agent negotiation in the context of marketplace simulation,
usually with a focus on negotiation strategies. The e-
Game (electronic Generic auction marketplace) platform
(Fasli and Michalakopoulos 2008) is a Java based, FIPA
compliant platform that shares many similarities with
PIRASA. Built for simulations into market infrastructure,
Fig. 9 Performance with increasing numbers of agents
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negotiation protocols, and strategic behavior, it supports
complex and dynamic auctions, facilitated by a scheduler
agent, which is roughly analogous to the broker agent in
PIRASA. However, e-Game does not just provide facilities
for scheduling, running and conducting experiments, but
enables modular implementation of auction-based market
simulations. The development of new simulations in e-
Game is tedious, requiring several thousand lines of code
for a simple market scenario.
Another attempt at automatic agent negotiation in the
context of auctions is the work of Benameur et al.
(Benameur et al. 2002), which considers a market setting
with: (i) one vendor (seller) and one buyer directly
negotiating; (ii) multiple vendors and one buyer are engaged
in a reverse auction; (iii) multiple buyers and one vendor
are engaged in a classical auction; (iv) multiple buyers and
vendors trade in a market. Their approach differs from ours
as they do not include broker agents, instead letting the
vendors manage the auctions themselves. Since they do not
rely on a third party agent, their auction model is generic
enough to simulate each instance of their market framework.
However, their implementation assumes that agents interact
in accordance with the English auction protocol (open-
outcry ascending) (Wooldridge 2009), which is a major
limitation when simulating complex market scenarios. As a
result, one-to-one bargaining could not be simulated.
Multiagent negotiation platforms are proposed to imple-
ment and analyze automated agent strategies for negoti-
ation. The eAgora platform (Chen et al. 2005) is an e-
marketplace constructed for the simulation of multi-issue
negotiations (a setting that cannot be easily modeled with
auctions), where either the buyer or the seller can be
the host. This is a difference from PIRASA. In addition,
eAgora represents agent negotiation strategies as either
competitive, collaborative, compromising, or accommo-
dating, which loosely corresponds with the attributes of
‘saver’ and ‘spender’ (with different proportional values)
in PIRASA. However, only the above four strategies are
supported, which is a limitation when compared to the adap-
tive nature of the infinitely many strategies that can be
constructed in PIRASA.
GENIUS (Lin et al. 2014) is a negotiation environment
that implements an open architecture for heterogeneous
negotiating agents. It provides a testbed for negotiating
agents that includes a set of negotiation problems for bench-
marking agents, a library of negotiation strategies, and ana-
lytical tools to evaluate an agent’s performance. GENIUS
is mainly used for evaluating bilateral negotiations, espe-
cially for agents participating in the automated negotiating
agents competition (ANAC) (Fujita et al. 2013). Williams
et al. extended GENIUS to provide support for concurrent
negotiations (Williams et al. 2012). However, this extension
addresses a specific experimental setup, and is not publicly
accessible. Moreover, we are not aware of any work that
evaluates the robustness and scalability of GENIUS when
using a large number of agents.
Motivated by the current limitations in GENIUS, RECON
(Alrayes et al. 2016) was developed as a robust multia-
gent environment for simulating concurrent negotiations.
RECON has been built on top of the GOLEM agent plat-
form (Bromuri and Stathis 2008), and supports the devel-
opment of software agents (both buyers and sellers) nego-
tiating concurrently with other agents over multiple issues.
In contrast to most agent development platforms such as
GENIUS, which only support imperative agents built in
Java, RECON supports agents developed with declarative
logic programs. Declarative agents enable developers to
specify strategies that can be transparent to a human user,
in that explanations can be provided for describing why the
agent has taken certain actions during a negotiation.
There are many commercial negotiation simulation
environments in the market (Sim 2002): Tete-a-Tete,
Kasbah, AuctionBot, and the Fisher market. Fisher market
is based on the Dutch auction protocol. The limitation with
the Dutch auction is when there is one seller then the
auctioneer will sell the product for the seller if the buyer
reservation price has not yet reached. Whereas, PIRASA
supports many protocol types depending on how many
sellers and buyers are in the market, and whether the goals
of the seller and buyer are to maximize profit or to prefer
a quick transaction. AuctionBot supports many auction
types including the Dutch auction. The same limitation
for Fisher market applies to AuctionBot, it is not suitable
when the sellers want to negotiate quickly or if there is
one agent in the market. On the other hand, Tete-a-Tete and
Kasbah offers one kind of negotiation protocol, whereas
PIRASA offers three kind of protocols, which can further
be customised and extended. One novelty that PIRASA
provides is that we are not limited to one type of protocol.
A variety of protocols, including Dutch auctions, can be
integrated into PIRASA using the customizable protocol
attributes, as well as adding new attributes.
Conclusions and future work
In this paper, we have presented PIRASA: an agent-based
platform for simulating e-commerce protocols. It allows
agents to determine which protocol is more beneficial
via experimentation in different settings. It supports
customization of agent attributes, which govern the agent’s
behavior. This enables to simulate realistic e-markets where
buyers compete with other to buy items from seller. Our
attempt is a first to do this in real-time.
PIRASA supports basic goals and constraints for the
agents, e.g., a deadline to purchase a specific item. Future
PIRASA: strategic protocol selection for e-commerce agents
work could result in hierarchical trees of predicates to
allow agents to retain highly complex goals. Goals could
also be extended to be domain specific, conforming to a
predefined ontology. In the current framework, we have
focused on buyers and have not implemented complicated
seller strategies. Having goals for the sellers as well would
lead to more realistic e-markets.
Having a depreciation or appreciation modifier for items
would add a new layer into PIRASA, as it would allow
buyers to be more strategic when choosing services to bid
on, i.e., a Saver agent could choose to fulfill a goal with a
lower quality yet cheaper item, as opposed to spending more
for a better item. This would also tie into seller strategy, as
the quality of an item could partially dictate the protocol
they use with which to sell it. For example, when trying to
sell a slightly depreciated item, such as a car which has had
a previous owner, there is a greater scope for negotiation.
Similarly, low quality items, such as an old sofa, could either
be negotiated or auctioned.
There might be other protocol types that can be
supported by modifying the protocol parameters. A Dutch
auction (also known as a clock auction or an open-outcry
descending-price auction) is the idea that a seller tries to sell
an item at a very high price, and slowly over time lowers that
price until some buyer is willing to pay and obtain the item.
This is referred to as an auction because it tends to provide
the market ceiling price for a seller.
We plan to extend our work in the following directions:
• We have evaluated protocols from the buyer’s point of
view. In a more realistic setting, a trader agent might
act both as a buyer and a seller in multiple competitive
markets. Investigation of such markets, as well as taking
into account the violations of agents’ norms, can help
understand how metrics such as social welfare evolve in
those markets.
• Performing statistical tests and understanding the
connection between agent traits and protocol properties
more closely would be helpful to determine whether
a protocol is significantly more beneficial to an agent
over the others.
• PIRASA can be extended to include additional multia-
gent protocols such as argumentation (Gao et al. 2016;
Ko¨kciyan et al. 2017) for resolving conflicts among
trading agents as well as between agents and their users.
Such agents should learn from previous encounters with
other agents as well as take into account user’s feed-
back on previous choices. Whereas such interactions are
helpful among the agent and its user, they introduce pri-
vacy concerns, e.g., what amount of information should
users share with their agents to maximize their utili-
ties, and how would this information propagate in the
market? In its current form, an agent in PIRASA does
not reveal its users’ preferences to other agents. The
agent only simulates the potential interactions as they
would be observed in a real transaction. Agent-based
privacy solutions (Baarslag et al. 2017; Kafalı et al.
2016a) can be employed to address information disclo-
sure concerns when the agent interacts with other agents
as well as its user.
• PIRASA can be extended to enable the participation of
human agents as part of the simulations to capture more
realistic e-commerce settings. Such humans agents
would not be autonomous, and would simply follow
orders from a human operator. Crowdsourcing studies
can be conducted to evaluate the interactions among
intelligent agents and human users.
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